University of Baltimore Law

ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2012

Republican Philosophy of Law
Mortimer N.S. Sellers

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/fac_bookchapters
Part of the Law Commons

Copyright © 2012. Routledge. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
applicable copyright law.

In sharp dissent from these autocratically
inclined theorists, and following instead
Aquinas's thesis that positive law should always be subject to evaluation in terms of a
higher natural law, thomists of the Renaissance identified unjust political laws as an important variety of instances in which the law is
nonbinding upon anyone. The English jurist
John Fortescue (ca. 1394-1476), his compatriot Christopher St. Germaine (1460-1549),
the Italian cardinal Robert Bellarmine
(1542-1621), and later the Puritan clergyman
Thomas Hooker (ca. 1586-1647) were among
thomistic legal theorists of the period promoting such a natural law-dependent view. They
followed Aquinas likewise in the opinion that
while natural law is not man-made, no higher
authority is required to propound it or to evaluate positive law in terms of it, because its nature is openly accessible to human reason.
The theorists so far discussed attended to
law exclusively as it applied to individuals residing in a given state or subject to its governance. However, as the rise of nation-states
brought international relations into prominence, such tho mists as the Spanish monks
Francisco de Vitoria (ca. 1492-1546) and
Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) sought to extend the concept of natural law to the area of
international affairs. In an extensive body of
writings, these thomists urged that we should
see rights, obligations, and the other conceptual constructs of natural law theory as belonging not just to individual persons in their dealings with one another and the state, but also to
nations in their dealings with other nations.
Thus, even if no international legislative body
had ever codified a positive law to cover international affairs, the same rational faculties that
enable our apprehension of the natural law in
the civil sphere provide us access to it in the international arena as well. If this is correct, then
relations among states do not obtain in the legal vacuum that otherwise threatens. The
Dutch Protestant legal theorist Hugo Grotius
(1583-1645) was noteworthy for making extensive further contributions to natural law
theory in its international applications.
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Republican Philosophy of Law

The legal theory of the Roman republic, as revived and elaborated in Renaissance Italy,
commonwealth England, and the legal traditions of the French and American revolutions,
is here called republican legal theory.
Republican legal theory developed out of
the jurisprudential and constitutional legacy of
the Roman res publica (public concerns), as
interpreted by subsequent admirers in Italy,
England, France, and the United States. Leading republican authors include Marcus Tullius
Cicero (106-43 B.C.), Niccolo Machiavelli
(1469-1527), James Harrington (1611-1677),
Algernon Sidney (1622?-1683), John Adams
(1735-1826), and (more controversially) subsequent self-styled "republican" legislators
such as Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) and
Charles Renouvier (1815-1903). Many im-
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portant writers outside the republican tradition also reflect its strong influence, including Montesquieu (1689-1755), Jean-Jacques
Rousseau (1712-1778), and Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804). These three also illustrate the
close connection between republican ideas and
the European Enlightenment leading up to the
French and American revolutions.
The central concepts of republican legal
theory include pursuit of the common good,
popular sovereignty, liberty, virtue, mixed government, and the rule of law, linked by a Roman conception of libertas that defined justice
between free people as subjection to no one's
will or interest, but only to general laws approved by the people for the common or
"public" good of the community.
Republican theorists have usually followed
Cicero's conception of Rome's republican laws
and institutions, as set out comprehensively in
his treatises De officiis (on duties), De legibus
(on the laws), and De republica (on public concerns). Other fundamental texts include the
first ten books of Titus Livius (59 B.C.-A.D. 17)
in his history of Rome, the sixth book of the
Histories of Polybius (ca. 205-123 B.C.), and
much less importantly, the works of Aristotle
(384-322 B.C.), insofar as they anticipate and
justify Roman practices. Of these authors only
Cicero primarily concerned himself with legal
institutions, not just in his monographs, but
also in letters and orations, including the widely
read Philippicae and speeches against Catiline.
Cicero and Livy took the proper province of
legislation to be the public interest or res publica, protected by laws established in advance,
to avert the influence of private considerations.
Private interests (res privata) also deserved protection, within their own sphere, defined by
public deliberation. The republican tradition
justified popular sovereignty as a necessary
check on self-interested factions, but only under
the guidance of an infrequently elected legislative councilor "senate." Necessary components
of a "republican" constitution on the Roman
model include a bicameral legislature, standing
laws, and elected magistrates.
Constitutional law has always been the
central concern of republican legal theory, but
several other components of the republican
tradition have provided judges, legislators,
and lawyers with standards of virtue and a
vocabulary for legal discourse. Republican
public virtue (virtus) is a disposition to serve
the common good. The Lives of L. Mestrius
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Plutarchus (ca. 50-120) supply a rich source
of republican narratives and models of civic
virtue. Cornelius Tacitus (ca. 55-120) and
Gaius Sallustius Crispus (86-34 B.C.) contain
salacious accounts of the vices that emerge
when republican principles decline. All three
authors had considerable influence on the
aims and invective of subsequent republican
theorists.
The central project for republicans since
Cicero consists in reviving the liberty, principles, and virtue of the Roman republic, while
avoiding the vices and constitutional flaws
that led eventually to the tyranny of emperors
and tragedy of civil war. Cicero had proposed
frequent rotation in office for executive officials and a strengthened senate, to control
both the magistrates and popular assembly.
Machiavelli suggested in his Discorsi sopra la
prima Deca di Tito Livio (1517-1518) that
republics thrive best in poverty and war,
which unite citizens in pursuit of the common
good. He concluded that wealth and leisure
made Rome too corrupt to be free. Harrington
agreed in his Commonwealth of Oceana
(1656) and advocated limits on landholding
and rotation in office, to maintain the civic
equality necessary for true republican virtue.
Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government
(1698) argued that wealth would actually
strengthen the republic, and he endorsed representation in the popular assembly to check
the excesses of direct democracy. Adams'
Thoughts on Government (1776) and Defence
of the Constitutions of Government of the
United States of America (1787-1788) also
embraced representation, with the added
check of a veto in the chief executive. James
Madison (1751-1836), writing The Federalist
(1787) under the republican pseudonym of
"Publius," praised the American republics'
central constitutional reform, which totally
excluded direct democracy from any active
role in legislation.
Despite their different proposals for protecting republican liberty and virtue, all the
main authors in the republican tradition
shared a basic conception of the constitution
and legal order that they sought to revive. This
embraced pursuit of the common good
through standing laws, ratified by controlled
popular sovereignty, in a bicameral legislature
of senate and democratic assembly, to be executed by elected magistrates. Republicans
agreed that unelected kings or any other unPHI LOS 0 P H Y
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controlled power in the constitution would
lead to self-interest and corruption. Liberty
and the common good depended on "mixed
government" and a "balanced constitution."
During the age of European revolution many
theorists reluctant to define themselves as "republican" accepted aspects of this ideology.
Montesquieu supported monarchy, which
made it impossible to endorse or even accurately to describe republican government.
However, he did embrace the common good
and rule of law in De l'esprit des lois (1748),
as well as balanced government, the senate,
and a (representative) popular assembly. Rousseau viewed a sovereign popular assembly as
the essential attribute of legitimate government. His essay Du contrat social (1762) insisted on ratification of all laws by a general
vote of the people, as was done in Rome.
Rousseau would have restricted the senate to a
purely executive function. Kant proposed in
Zum ewigen Frieden (1795) the creation of an
international federation of republican states,
to provide the basis for perpetual peace.
Rousseau's identification of liberty with
law, and law with the common good, repeated
the republican formula of Cicero, Machiavelli,
Harrington, Sidney, and even Montesquieu,
who put it into a monarchical context. Rousseau differed only in his program for realizing
republican virtue. Republicans since Harrington had endorsed representation as a technique
for purifying the popular will. Republicans
since Cicero and Polybius had praised mixed
government as the best control of private passions. Rousseau, however, preferred the democratic formula that only plebiscites make law.
He attributed this idea of a unitary state to the
Spartan king Lycurgus, which reflected his general preference for Spartan equality to republican balance-even to the extent of accepting
slavery for some to maintain the liberty and
virtue of the rest. Montesquieu had also admired Spartan poverty and virtue. Both authors insisted that republican purity could only
survive in small states or cantons, like Sparta
and Geneva. French unicameralism and the
Reign of Terror under Maximilien Robespierre
(1758-1794) both derived in large part from
Rousseau's fascination with the homogeneity,
poverty, and asceticism of Sparta. Rousseau's
direction has colored the tone of French republicanism ever since and marks the beginning of
separate republican traditions in France and
the United States.
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The republican revolution of the American Civil War represented a rejection of
"Greek" republicanism, with its frank reliance
on slavery, and a return to the Roman rhetoric
of liberty and Cicero's condemnation of servitude as a violation of natural law. American
republicans never feared commerce or wealth,
and the new "Republican" party sought to
maximize both and reinvigorate the common
good through a widened electorate and universal rule of law. The Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution protected the
original Constitution's guarantee of a "republican form of government" by forbidding the
states to deny any person the equal protection
of the laws or to deny citizenship and its privileges to any persons born in the United States.
The strongly republican nature of early
American constitutionalism produced a senate, a bicameral legislature, elected executives,
balanced government, popular sovereignty,
and broad commitments to the "general welfare," "liberty" and "due process" of the law.
Yet twentieth-century American constitutionalism developed after the World War II toward
a dry "legal process" theory that endorsed the
frank pursuit of self-interest by an atomized
and unreflective electorate. The recent American republican constitutional revival emerged
in response to moral dissatisfaction with postwar liberal interest-group pluralism as a suitable basis for any just legal order.
The republican revival began among intellectual historians such as Gordon Wood
(1933- ) and J.G.A. Pocock (1924- ) in the
1960s and 1970s, followed in the late 1980s
by legal academics such as Cass Sunstein
(1954- ) and Frank Michelman (1936- ), who
argued that the United States Constitution reflects an ideology of shared citizenship and
common purpose that might justify judicial intervention against self-interested legislation.
Their primary arguments concerned republican deliberation and the common good, rather
than republican institutions. This self-styled
"liberal" republicanism echoes Rousseau,
Montesquieu, and the American antifederalists in questioning the value of popular sovereignty in a very large and pluralistic republic
and in preferring the local democracy of
smaller cantons and communities.
Liberal critics of republicanism question
whether this heightened civic federalism can
solve the problem of pluralism without an intolerable threat to personal autonomy. For
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many, the very idea of a shared common good
appears a veil for intolerance and oppression.
Republicanism implies the possibility of collective objectivity and seems alarmingly antidemocratic in its reliance on the senate and judiciary.
Roman checks and balances intentionally frustrate the immediate will of the people to serve
their common good. If private desires and personal interests are everything, the self-denial of
republican virtue must be pointless.
Liberal fears of republicanism reflect liberal fears of government that go back at least
as far as the English Revolution of 1688.
When they are not virtuous the people may be
dangerous, and even Cicero feared the tyranny
of the mob more than the tyranny of kings.
Sometimes in the wake of civil war monarchs
promise safe and stable government. Rome
settled for Augustus (63 B.e-A.D. 14), England
for Charles II (1630-1685), and France for
Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821). In each case
subjects received from their sovereign guarantees that protected the private sphere while
ceding public power to the state. Benjamin
Constant (1767-1830) frankly distinguished
the (republican) "liberty of the ancients," in
De la liberte des anciens comparee celie des
modernes (1819), "for which we are no longer
fit," from the (liberal) "liberty of the moderns"-liberty to pursue one's own private
pleasures in peace. Modern liberalism emerged
from the older republican tradition, when full
republicanism no longer seemed attainable.
Republican legal theory remains America's central contribution to modern legal discourse, through the United States Constitution's practical demonstration that popular
sovereignty may seek liberty and justice in
pursuit of the common good, through the rule
of law, checks and balances, a deliberative senate, and a stable judiciary, without collapsing
into tyranny and civil war. The Roman republic provided a model and inspiration for republican theorists in America, as it had in
Italy, England, and France. The United States,
however, became the first nation since Rome
to make this system work, through the inn ova tion of representation in the popular assembly.
Republican theory triumphed so completely in
America that its origins are largely forgotten.
Most modern legal discourse is in some sense
"republican," because republican theory is so
deeply entrenched in the universal institutions
of contemporary constitutional government.
Almost every generation experiences some re-
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turn to republican first principles, as well as
new attempts to build civic community and a
revived legal order from the ruins of the west's
oldest and most persistent legal and political
philosophy.
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Rescue in Tort and Criminal Law

The common law traditionally has recognized
no general duty to aid another person in danger.
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